Will future historians view the 2004-7 enlargements as a heroic step towards the unification of Europe, or the point at which the European Union's (EU) glory days came to an end? Much will depend on how the European Commission, a uniquely 'politicized bureaucracy' under constant pressure both to enforce common rules and to deviate from them, copes with enlargement. This paper reviews early evidence of enlargement's impact on the Commission. Its central argument is that enlargement has not fundamentally altered the role of the Commission, but it has reinforced the impact of several other changes that are 'secular' ones not exclusively or even specifically linked to enlargement. They include: the emergence of a younger and more flexible Commission, one that is more 'Presidential', and one which can no longer rely as much on its traditional monopoly power to propose formal legislation to influence EU policy debates.
Enlargement is one, but only one, amongst multiple rationale being used by reformers to 'reinvent' the Commission.
Only the most courageous contemporary analyst could claim to know what significance in the historical trajectory of the European Union (EU) will be attributed by future historians to the 2004-7 enlargements. Perhaps the radical expansion of the EU's membership will come to be seen as one of the most heroic, important and valued steps ever taken towards the political unification of Europe. This view assumes that the EU system will prove itself able to absorb an 80 per cent increase in member states in three different senses. First, the EU's institutions will smoothly and successfully integrate nationals from the new 12 member states. Second, the EU-12, many of which have recently regained their sovereignty, will pool it without much hesitation and thus enhance the legitimacy of EU decisions and institutions. Third, the EU system will continue to function without any 'seizing up' of decision-making.
Alternatively, 2004 might be viewed as marking the end of the EU's glory days.
Afterwards, the unique European post-war experience of pooling sovereignty and delegating authority to enforce agreements to the EU's institutions would become a sort of museum piece. A system designed during the Cold War for limited ends, and which (by some accounts) generated many consequences unintended by its designers, would finally lose its almost miraculous capacity for agency. Especially given the failure of the Constitutional Treaty -a result that might be blamed in large part on enlargement itself (see Cohen-Tanugi 2005) -the competing demands of 27 governments would, by this view, produce paralysis. To borrow from a leading analyst of European foreign policy, the EU would no longer be an 'action organization' and would become more like other international organizations (such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe): a 'framework organization' in which governments debated and discussed issues of collective interest but engaged in little or no actual collective action (Hill 2004: 159) .
The present volume* is designed to give future historians a place to start, although it would be surprising if the analyses pointed 'cleanly' towards either of the two scenarios just sketched. It may well be that some EU institutions absorb enlargement without much difficulty, while others struggle, especially in the first years after 2004. An opposite problem is that the EU's institutions ultimately and inevitably succeed or fail together (see Peterson and Shackleton 2006) . Identifying the effects of enlargement on the EU system may be a different, and trickier, exercise than identifying its effects on individual EU institutions.
However, if our aim is to pinpoint enlargement's effects on the European Commission, we could do much worse than look to a perceptive examination of the central dilemma facing the Commission from its creation, written by one of this volume's editors and published over a decade ago. The dilemma arises from tension 'between [the Commission's] duty to develop and apply common rules and continuous political pressure for deviation' (Christiansen 1997: 77) . Living with this dilemma makes the Commission a uniquely 'politicized bureaucracy'. It seems uncontroversial to suggest that this dilemma stands to become more acute for a Commission that must now serve an enormously diverse Union of 27 states, nearly 500 million consumers, and unprecedented economic disparities.
Of course, the Commission, along with other EU institutions, is different from other international institutions in that it 'has the capacity and legitimacy to act relatively independently of member states' assent' (Christiansen 1997: 73) , at least in theory.
1 In practice, the Commission usually only succeeds when it works with the assent of a critical mass of member states. The problem, of course, is that the critical mass in an EU of 27 is now much bigger than before. Has enlargement made the Commission's job impossible?
In trying to answer the question, this analysis confronts the same issues which preoccupy other contributors to this volume. Specifically, it aims to identify the main challenges and pressures for change in the role of the Commission, especially those arising from enlargement. It also considers the nature and extent of change in the Commission's working methods, the quantity and quality of its output, and its interaction with other EU institutions since 2004. The evidence on which it relies is, by nature, early evidence in two different senses. First, the post-2004 enlargements are still recent phenomena whose effects will only be revealed in time. Second, we draw on material from interviews designed primarily to set the agenda for a forthcoming attitudinal survey of the Commission (which itself investigates, inter alia, the effects on enlargement).
Nevertheless, we make a clear and straightforward argument: enlargement has not fundamentally altered the role of the Commission, but it has reinforced the impact of several other secular changes not exclusively or even specifically linked to enlargement.
They include: the emergence of a younger and more flexible Commission, one that is more Presidential, and one which can no longer rely as much on its traditional monopoly power to propose formal legislation to influence EU policy debates. Enlargement is one, but only one, amongst multiple rationale being used by reformers to reinvent the Commission.
We proceed in four parts. Section 1 offers an overview of the lively politics of enlarging a politicized bureaucracy. Section 2 considers a second, major, life-changing event for the Commission: the Kinnock reforms of its administrative code and working methods. In section 3, we consider where the Commission presently stands in the EU's institutional system. Section 4 offers views from the coalface by reporting on interviews with top Commission officials about how enlargement has, or has not, changed its role, work and methods.
'Enlarging' a Politicized Bureaucracy
The accession to the EU One effect was to remove -for the moment anyway -another big political project from EU's agenda, along with the Euro, the Constitutional Treaty, the development of a common foreign policy, services liberalization, and a new global trade round. All were either completed or stalled. As such, it might be thought that the Commission was set to become a more technocratic, apolitical body in an emerging 'post-vision' era in European integration. In any case, an EU of 27 member states was always going to be more difficult to shift quickly or dramatically in any new direction, let alone to agree on some vision of the EU's future.
Nevertheless, there are numerous reasons, specified in this section, to think that the Commission is destined to remain a uniquely politicized bureaucracy. It is worth revisiting Christiansen's (1997: 77) original elaboration of this typology and quoting it at length to remind ourselves why the typology fits:
What detracts from the bureaucratic element in the Commission's activity -what makes the Commission 'less bureaucratic' than other bureaux -is the nature of continuous bargaining in the Union. The major fields of Commission activityproposing legislation and supervising the implementation of decisions -are highly politicized tasks.…the nature of much of the Commission's work -the overarching regulatory function it fulfills for the European Union, the large degree of symbolism that is often involved in EU decision-making, the continuing process of expansion of the EU's institutional framework, the ongoing process of 'constitutional reform' -has meant that numerous political forces take exceptional interest in the internal proceedings of the Commission.
This 'exceptional interest' has been on prominent display in recent years, in large part because of enlargement. Consider the Commission's own composition and how any proposal to change it resonates at the highest political levels. Recall how bitterly fought was the debate about the size of the College (now 27) of Commissioners as designated in the Constitutional Treaty (Norman 2003 Enlargement also appeared to make the Commission more 'popular', or at least less unpopular by expanding the number of EU citizens who viewed it favourably (see Table 1 ). The Commission clearly suffered by association with the failed Constitutional Treaty in 2005. However, majorities in all EU-12 states (except Latvia) said they tended to trust the Commission by late 2006, a result significantly higher than the overall EU figure of 48 per cent. 11 The share of EU citizens who said they did not trust the Commission declined in 2006. While only around one out of five EU-12 citizens said they trusted the Commission, around one-third in the EU-15 reported this view. 12 In a sense, enlargement appears to be as pro-Commission as the Commission is proenlargement.
It was not always thus in the cases of previous enlargements. The first Eurobarometer poll, taken in spring 1974 after the first enlargement, today looks Neanderthal -full of errors and apparently typed on numerous typewriters -on the Commission's web-site. It contains none of the now-familiar questions reported on earlier in this section. However, nearly all questions -in this poll as well as those taken over the next several years -showed support for the European Economic Community (as it was then) and all it did to be considerably higher in the original 6 member states than in United Kingdom, Denmark or Ireland. 13 Similarly, the share of citizens who thought their state benefited from Community membership was higher in the original 10
Community states than in Spain or Portugal for several years after the latter two joined in
1986.
14 Since the 1995 enlargement, shares of Austrians and (especially) Swedes reporting trust in the EU generally or Commission specifically have always been lower than the EU averages (which the Finnish totals broadly match).
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If enlargement can be interpreted as boosting the image and profile of the Commission beyond Brussels, there is also evidence to suggest that it is encouraging change in the way the Commission works internally. One of the Commission's most experienced officials explained:
The Commission is now less cosy. Enlargement has brought us new blood and enthusiasm and people who are open to change…and that has contributed to change in our working methods, especially in terms of policy design and implementation. Both are now more difficult because we face much more diversity [in an . Designing anything that is legally binding is much harder. We inevitably look to more flexible, framework approaches. previously, mostly because the President and his key allies were so committed to it. But enlargement was prompting changes in the Commission's administrative culture and not just because of the 'push' effect of recruiting new, reform-minded EU-10 officials, which (again) was anyway behind schedule. The 'pull' effect of having to design policy suitable for all member states in an enormously diverse EU of 27 was considerable.
As a caveat, framework approaches were far more common in some sectorssuch as environmental and enterprise policy -than in others, such as police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, or what used to be called justice and home affairs (JHA).
In fact, the pace with which the Commission produced formal legislative JHA proposals in the early years of the Barroso Presidency was sometimes breath-taking and often seemed designed to make political points. A final change hastened, but certainly not exclusively driven by enlargement was the emergence of a more Presidential Commission: one more dominated by the political and policy choices and preferences of its President. In some respects, enlargement made the Commission President's job -never an easy one to start with -almost impossible.
Surely, no political figure in the world had more 'constituents' than Barroso, particularly strong-willed ones within governments who considered themselves to have a legitimate claim on his time and agenda. One indicative barometer was the number of days Barroso was compelled to spend outside of Brussels: a total of 168 in 2006 alone. 20 More generally, the challenge of ensuring coherence in the College was daunting.
In theory, the College is meant to uphold collective responsibility: all of its decisions, even those requiring a vote by simple majority, are unanimous ones which all 
Reforming a Politicized Bureaucracy
Of all 'angles' from which the Commission might be studied, the administrative reform angle has spawned the largest academic mini-industry. 22 The so-called Kinnock reforms (Kassim 2004a) and evidence that the Commission could deliver on a 'heroic if thankless task' (Kassim 2004b) . Others stressed that they were being applied to 'a very unpromising a reform environment' (Levy and Stevens 2004: 2) and a
Commission that was both overloaded with tasks and risk averse (Levy 2006) .
We do not propose to offer yet another verdict here on how effective, or not, the reforms will be in modernizing the Commission. Instead, we note (briefly) that the Kinnock reforms are bound up with enlargement in at least three respects. First, and very simply, the reforms were a considerable shock to the Commission in close proximity in terms of time with enlargement. Few administrations adapt smoothly and quickly to major changes in their working methods or the pool of applicants from which they recruit their officials. Having to cope with both in a relatively short period of time might be seen as a kind of 'perfect storm' for the Commission (see Peterson 2008) .
Second, enlargement and the reforms were linked in the minds of many Commission officials. One reason why is that internal Commission communications about the reforms justified them as necessary in light of 'the forthcoming enlargement of the Union, which would have a major impact on the tasks of the Commission and on its internal make up and culture' (Bearfield 2004: 17) . 23 But another is that (especially) personnel reforms, symbolized by a new administrative statute unveiled (coincidentally?)
in May 2004, were widely-resented across the services. Especially younger officials, who are now, of course, disproportionately EU-12 nationals, 24 feel aggrieved by a new promotion system that doubles the number of promotions needed to get to the same administrative grade, with only half as much additional pay per promotion compared to the system it replaced. Meanwhile, a complicated system links appraisal to promotion and is based on an unfathomable system of awarding points. A senior official in DG Administration admits the system, which is being revisited, is 'widely-hated…The best case would be that the top 10 per cent could fly through the ranks. We are clearly not there yet'. 25 In fact, the reality is that many Commission officials, especially those from EU-12 states, believe that the purpose of the Kinnock reforms was to economize on the cost of enlargement while reining in the Commission by creating a growth market in scrutiny. Kinnock (2004: 11) himself perhaps lives up to his reputation for saying more than is really necessary by pointing out that the EU's administration is inexpensive, costing only 5 per cent of the Union's budget, and that in fact enlargement will make it even cheaper because of the reduced salary bill that comes with lowering the average age of officials.
Third and finally, it is worth asking whether the Commission has been made an even more politicized bureaucracy by enlargement. As we have seen, EU-10 governments are far less concerned about making the Commission a meritocracy than ensuring that they retain 'their' Commissioner and are allotted what they consider a fair share of senior posts in the services. Moreover, it might be hypothesized that the more member states are admitted to the EU, the more concern and emphasis there must inevitably be on control: particularly, ensuring that EU funds are spent correctly by a larger number of national administrations, including many with limited capacity for management or audit. (tightened procedures and audit) and away from the agenda of efficiency and performance' (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004: 234) . Second, the Commission has 'few direct contacts with citizens' (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004: 234) . As such, it lacks 'clients' who can be relied upon to defend it from this and future waves of reform that -whatever else they are designed to do -may have the effect of limiting or reducing its autonomy, prerogatives, or dignity. A politicized bureaucracy that lacks a political constituency seems a strange anomaly. But that is precisely what the Commission is.
The Commission in the EU System
It is never easy to get a clear read on the standing of the Commission in the EU system, for two basic reasons. One is that the Commission inevitably finds it expedient to hide its light under a bushel: specifically, to allow member states, especially the holder of the Council Presidency, to take political credit for agreements that it helps to broker. When the Commission does so, it often finds the next deal easier to broker. The Commission often may be more powerful than it wishes to appear to be.
Second, the Commission is, as Christiansen (1997: 82) shows, not just a supranational administration but 'also an intergovernmental body' (even though some of his evidence, such as national 'flags' on senior posts, is no longer relevant). It is probably more accurate to say that every interest, including national ones, with a stake in any EU policy is represented within the Commission than to say that the Commission internalizes and There was little change in the frequency or pattern of opposition to Commission proposals, although member states used formal statements to signal their opposition more often (as opposed to actually voting no) and larger EU member states were the main dissidents less frequently than they were before enlargement. Predictably, the EU got far more done by resorting to QMV (a record high in the use of co-decision was registered in 2006) than unanimity in the EU-25.
In these circumstances, Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse (2007) find that mediation and brokership have become more important determinants of outcomes. Of course, the Commission has always shared these functions with the Council Presidency and Council
General Secretariat, and thus the role of the Commission in an enlarged EU is a matter on which insiders 'have very different views' (Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse (2007: 25) . Some claim that the Commission wields more influence than ever before, as revealed in (say) If there is such a disconnect, an important institutional mechanism for closing it is the Commission President's membership of the European Council. In fact, one of the most important determinants of the Commission's standing in the EU system generally is its President's standing in this EU institution. Commission Presidents lack any power base comparable to those of European Heads of State and Government and so must 'derive his authority from other sources' (Crum et al. 2004: 2) . Of all of Jacques Delors' political assets while he was Commission President (1985-95), none was more important than the respect he commanded at this level, where he became viewed (at least for a time) as an equal by heavyweights such as Helmut Kohl, François Mitterrand, and even Margaret
Thatcher (Peterson 2006: 85) . Delors' capacity for hard work was legendary and it was rare that anyone in the room at a European Council meeting knew the details of any dossier better than the Commission President.
In contrast, both Santer and Prodi were frequently bullied by EU Heads of State and Government, despite each themselves being a former Prime Minister (of Luxembourg and Italy respectively). For his part, in the words of a very senior Commission official, Barroso showed himself to be a 'player' in the European Council. 26 Several EU summits towards the middle of his term agreed policy statements -no mean feat in itself in an 88-9). It was unhelpful to Prodi, as well as a sign of his weak leadership, that the College under his Presidency could not agree a unified position on its own composition. Yet, the Commission failed to agree such a position during three previous rounds of debate on institutional reform in the 1990s (see Gray and Stubb 2001) . In all of these cases, including that of the Constitutional Treaty, the Commission's inability to decide how its own house should be ordered acted to marginalize it debates on institutional reform more generally. 
Views from the Coalface
A final quarry to be mined for evidence of how the Commission's role has changed as a consequence of enlargement is a series of semi-structured interviews with Commission officials. The interviews were conducted mostly with senior officials (some very senior) and for a variety of purposes, including the present analysis. 31 The main purpose of most of the interviews was to probe perceptions in the Commission, particularly at its highest levels, about specific questions that might appear on a questionnaire, including ones related to enlargement, which will be the basis for a forthcoming, large-scale attitudinal survey of the Commission. 32 Respondents were presented in advance with a standardised list of (pre-tested) questions. Three of the four questions on which we report here were 'yes/no' questions,
but one was open-ended and was asked with no prompting of responses, thus clearly necessitating the codification of answers. However, to preserve the considerable nuance and pertinence of comments offered by respondents to the 'yes/no' questions, many of whom qualified their yes or no responses, codification was required here as well. 33 All interviews were conducted in the latter half of 2006, which was probably the earliest that most officials could be expected to have formed a view of the effect(s) of enlargement. Care was taken to construct a reasonably diverse sample that included different categories of Commission official, including EU-15 and EU-10 nationals in the services, as well as officials in the cabinets of Commissioners from both categories of member state. 34 The sample gives us a decidedly 'small n' survey on a strictly limited number of common questions, but nonetheless yields an original data set. The results shed interesting light on perceptions within the institution about how and how much enlargement is perceived to have changed the Commission. The results yielded by responses to our final two questions might seem to contradict. Alternatively, they might hint at a rather specific shift in the evolution of the Commission. Table 4 reports views on whether the Commission works more on the basis of personal networks, as it was widely alleged to do during the Delors years (Grant 1994; Ross 1995; Drake 2000) , as opposed to hierarchy. All respondents said (broadly) 'yes'
with the exceptions of two EU-10 officials in the services, who would be in the category of official -new to the Commission and not a member of a cabinet -we might least expect to feel 'networked' in the Commission. Perhaps most interesting was the specific, highly nuanced set of comments made by respondents (reported in notes 36 and 37).
There are hints that clashes between certain members of Barroso's College -especially
Vice-President and Commissioner for Enterprise, Günter Verheugen -and the services may be pushing in the direction of a more hierarchical Commission, and that the old, elite, French-dominated, Delorist networks are now a thing of the past. But there are also suggestions here that enlargement itself is a catalyst for more hierarchy, or at least a Commission that is no longer the remarkably medieval administration that it used to be. We should conclude this section with strong caveats about the evidence on which it reports. Again, it is drawn from a very small data set that provides just beyond anecdotal evidence on how enlargement is affecting the Commission and the way in which it works. Perhaps above all, the amount of research effort expended to generate even these modest 'findings' points to our need for more comprehensive evidence on the recent evolution of the Commission's role and institutional life, of the kind that might (hopefully) be generated by the survey project mentioned earlier.
Conclusion (to be revised and extended)
We have found that enlargement has not fundamentally altered the role of the Commission, but it has reinforced the impact of several other secular changes that are not exclusively or even specifically linked to enlargement. Again, they include the emergence of a younger and more flexible Commission, one that is more Presidential, and one that no longer seems determined to exploit its traditional monopoly power to propose formal legislation to influence EU policy debates. We have considered how the Kinnock reforms are linked in time and space to enlargement, at least in the minds of many officials, and how they may well end up having effects that were not highlighted or even intended by their designers. The Commission's role in the EU's institutional system is evolving in interesting ways, but mostly because of Barroso's strong stamp on his Commission, and the stark contrast between its priorities and those of the Prodi
Commission. The data extracted from interviews point to a number of hypotheses worthy of testing in future research, perhaps above all the possibility that the Commission is becoming more hierarchical. Enlargement is one, but only one, amongst multiple rationale being used by reformers to try to reinvent the Commission.
